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ABSTRACT
With the prevalence of GNSS technologies, nowadays freely avail-
able for everyone, location based vehicle services such as elec-
tronic tolling pricing systems and pay-as-you-drive services are
rapidly growing. Because these systems collect and process travel
records, if not carefully designed, they can threat users’ location
privacy. Finding a secure and privacy-friendly solution is a chal-
lenge for system designers. In addition to location privacy, com-
munication and computation overhead should be taken into account
as well in order to make such systems widely adopted in prac-
tice. In this paper, we propose a new electronic toll pricing sys-
tem based on group signatures. Our system preserves anonymity of
users within groups, in addition to correctness and accountability.
It also achieves a balance between privacy and overhead imposed
upon user devices.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General—Secu-
rity and protection; K.4.1 [Computer and Society]: Public Policy
Issues—Privacy
General Terms
Security and privacy
Keywords
electronic toll pricing systems, security protocols, privacy
1. INTRODUCTION
Electronic Toll Pricing (ETP) systems, by collecting tolls electron-
ically, aim to eliminate delays due to queuing on toll roads and
thus to increase the throughput of transportation networks. Since
Norway built the first working ETP system in 1986, ETP systems
have been implemented worldwide. Nowadays, by exploiting the
availability of free Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS),
traditional ETP systems are evolving into more sophisticated loca-
tion based vehicular services. They can offer smart pricing, e.g.,
by charging less who drives on roads without congestions or dur-
ing off-peak hours. Insurance companies can also bind insurance
SAC’12 March 25-29, 2012, Riva del Garda, Italy.
premiums to roads that their users actually use, and offer a service
known as “Pay-As-You-Drive” (PAYD) [21]. Moreover, the col-
lected traffic usage records can be used for public interest, such as
planning roads maintenance, or for resolving legal disputes in case
of accidents. As location is usually considered as a sensitive and
private piece of information, ETP and PAYD systems raise obvious
privacy concerns. In addition, by processing locations and travel
records, they can learn and reveal user sensitive information such
as home addresses and medical informations [15], which conse-
quently can lead to material loss or even bodily harm. Building
secure ETP and PAYD systems that guarantee location privacy and
high quality of service is actually a scientific challenge.
In the last few years, secure ETP and PAYD systems have been
widely studied [21, 6, 18, 3, 9, 16]. They can roughly be di-
vided into two categories based on whether locations are stored
in user devices or collected by central toll servers. PriPAYD [21],
PrETP [3], the cell-based solution described in [9], and Milo [16]
belong to the first category. In these systems, locations and tolls
are managed by user devices while servers are allowed to process
only aggregated data. In the second category we find VPriv [18],
where the server stores a database of users’ travel history, and the
ETP system described in [6], where the server collects hash values
of the trip records.
Both categories have advantages and disadvantages. Hiding loca-
tions from servers drastically reduces concerns about location pri-
vacy. However, the load for user devices is considerable. Typi-
cally, devices have to manage the storage of locations and proofs
to convince servers not to have cheated, e.g., making use of zero-
knowledge proofs. On the other side, the availability of locations
databases collected by servers like in VPriv can help improve appli-
cations such as traffic monitoring and control although the integra-
tion of multiple systems should be carried out carefully. Whereas,
solutions to preserve location privacy become a mandatory require-
ment. In this paper, we follow the design principles of VPriv [18].
In VPriv, users select a set of random tags beforehand and send
their locations attached with these tags to the toll server. The server
then computes and returns all location fees. Each user adds up
his location fees according to his tags and proves the summation’s
correctness to the server by using zero-knowledge proof, without
revealing the ownership of the tags. This process needs to run sev-
eral rounds every time to avoid user behaviours deviating from the
system. Thus the main disadvantage with VPriv is that the com-
putation and communication overhead increases linearly with the
number of rounds executed and with the number of users.
Our contributions. We propose a novel but simple ETP system
which achieves a balance between privacy and overhead for users.
By dividing users into groups and calculating toll in one round,
we reduce the amount of exchanged information as well as the
computation overhead due to the smaller number of locations of
a group. We use group signature schemes to guarantee anonymity
within a group, with the authority being the group manager. From
a group signature, only the group manager can learn the identity of
the signer in the group. Note that the concept of groups, however,
requires us to design an effective group division policy to optimally
preserve users’ location privacy. We discuss a solution in Sect. 6.
Users collect their locations and anonymously send them to the
toll server, together with locations signed using a group signature
scheme. To prevent the authority from learning user locations while
opening signatures to resolve disputes, only the hashed values of lo-
cations are signed. When it comes time to pay the toll, the server
publishes the hashed locations collected and the related fees. Fees
are encrypted with a homomorphic cryptosystem. Clients identify
the fees that correspond to their locations, add them up (homomor-
phically), and return the summation as their payments which, in
turn, are opened by the server. If the summation of user payments
does not match the summation of the fees of collected locations,
the server asks the authority to find out the dishonest user. Together
with the request, it sends to the authority the received group signa-
tures, the corresponding encrypted fees, and user payments. The
authority cannot deduce locations from the fees because of the ho-
momorphic cryptosystem but, based on the location signatures and
the fees, it can compute (homomorphically) the real toll of each
user, and can thus identify the misbehaving users: they are those
whose committed payments differ from the real tolls.
We prove that our system is correct (users always pay their usage to
the server) and assures accountability (originators of misbehaviours
can always be found and an effective punishing policy can be run to
avoid repetitive misbehaviours). Furthermore, our system enforces
unlinkability between users and their locations.
Structure of the paper. Sect. 2 describes the participants of our
system, the threat model and our assumptions, and it states the se-
curity goals of our design. Sect. 3 recalls group signature schemes
and other cryptographic primitives we adopt. Our ETP system is
fully described in Sect. 4. Sect. 5 defines the security properties
and shows their enforcement by our system. We conclude our pa-
per in Sect. 6 with some discussions and ideas for future work.
2. SYSTEM MODEL
Principals. Our system consists of the following four principals:
users, their cars with on board units (OBUs), the authority, and the
toll server (see Fig. 1).
Users own and drive cars, and they are responsible for toll pay-
ments. To be entitled to use the electronic tolling service, a user
brings his car to the authority, which registers the car and installs
an OBU on it. The authority is a governmental department trusted
by both users and the toll server. It also builds up the group sig-
nature scheme and manages groups of users. An OBU computes
the car’s locations using GNSS satellites and stores them in a USB
stick, which interfaces the OBU and contains security information.
It transmits location data to the toll server, which is a logical or-
ganisation that can be run by multiple agents. The server collects
location data and computes the fee for each location record. It can
also contact the authority to resolve disputes with insolvent users.
OBU
Cars
Users
Server
Authority
GNSS Satellites
manage
chargetransmit location data
issue
own
Figure 1: The relationship among the principals.
Adversary model. Considering the deployment environment of
ETP systems, the possible threats can come from: 1) manipulated
OBUs, which generate false location tuples; 2) dishonest users,
who (partially) avoid to pay for their road usage; 3) dishonest toll
servers, who intend to increase their revenue and breach users’ pri-
vacy; 4) the honest but curious authority.
Assumptions. In our system, dishonest servers perform any ac-
tions so as to satisfy their strong economic motivation and curiosity.
They can deviate from the protocol specification and collude with
other attackers. The attackers considered in the system follow the
Dolev-Yao intruder model [8]. Specifically, they have full control
over the network, which means they can eavesdrop, block and inject
messages anywhere at anytime. However, an encrypted message
can never be opened unless they have the right key. The identifica-
tion based on the message transmission is out of our scope in this
paper. We assume that location tuples are transmitted to toll servers
anonymously. This can be achieved by the architecture in [11], for
instance, which uses a communication service provider to separate
authentication from data collection. The authority is supposed to
be curious but not to collude with any other participants.
It has been shown that users’ moving traces can be reconstructed
from anonymised positions, e.g., by multi-target tracking techniques
or taking into account user mobility profiles [12, 20], and users’ pri-
vate information can thus be inferred [13]. However, we observed
from experiments in the literature that tracking users remains dif-
ficult in practice, especially when the intervals between transmis-
sions are big (about one minute) and the number of traveling users
is not small. Therefore, similar to VPriv, in this paper, we focus on
privacy leakage from ETP systems without considering the above
mentioned techniques and attacks.
Security Properties. In addition to the aim of reducing commu-
nication and computation overheads, our system should employ
proper measures to protect honest users and servers. Referring to
what other systems achieve (e.g., [21, 18, 3]), we address the fol-
lowing security properties:
Correctness. Clients pay for their own road usage and the server
collects the right amount of tolls.
Accountability. If a malicious action that deviates from the specifi-
cation of the system occurs, sufficient evidence can be gathered to
identify its originator.
Unlinkability. An intruder cannot link a given location record to its
generator.
3. CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRIMITIVES
Group Signature Schemes. Group signatures [5] provide the sign-
ers anonymity among a group of users. A group signature scheme
involves group members and a group manager. The task of the
group manager is to organise the group, to set up the group signa-
ture infrastructure and to reveal the signer if needed. The signature
of a message, signed by a group member, can be verified by oth-
ers based on the group public key while the identity of the signer
remains secret.
Group signature schemes consist of at least the following five func-
tions: SETUP, JOIN, SIGN, VERIFY and OPEN. The function SETUP
initialises the group public key, the group manager’s secret key and
other related data. The procedure JOIN allows new members to
join the group. Group members call the function SIGN to generate
a group signature based on their secret keys. The VERIFY function
makes use of the group public key to check if the signature is signed
by a group member. The function OPEN determines the identity of
the signer based on the group manager secret key.
We take group signature schemes as an essential building block
of our system because they have the following properties, which
effectively meet our security goals.
CORRECTNESS Signatures produced by a group member using SIGN
must be accepted by VERIFY.
UNFORGEABILITY Only group members are able to sign messages
on behalf of the group.
ANONYMITY Given a valid signature of some message, identify-
ing the actual signer is unfeasible for everyone but the group
manager.
UNLINKABILITY Deciding whether two different valid signatures
were computed by the same group member is unfeasible.
EXCULPABILITY Neither a group member nor the group manager
can sign on behalf of other group members.
TRACEABILITY The group manager is always able to open a valid
signature and identify the actual signer.
COALITION-RESISTANCE A colluding subset of group members
cannot generate a valid signature that the group manager can-
not link to one of the colluding group members.
There are some other properties we desire as well, e.g., efficiency
and dynamic group management. Efficiency contains the length
of signatures and computation time of each function, which deter-
mines the feasibility of our system. Dynamic group management
enables users to join and quit at any time when they are new or not
satisfied with current groups.
In the last decade, efficient group signature schemes with new fancy
features have been developed, e.g., group message authentication [19]
and group signcryption [2]. We will make use of an abstract version
of group signature schemes in the description of our system as it
can adopt any group signature scheme as long as it has the required
security properties. Moreover, some of the schemes may improve
the security of our system. For instance, an efficient group sign-
cryption scheme can prevent attackers from eavesdropping users’
location signatures over the network.
Homomorphic Cryptosystem. Besides group signatures, we em-
ploy another cryptographic primitive – homomorphic public key
cryptosystem. Let EX(m1) and EX(m2) be two cipher texts of
message m1 and m2 encrypted by agent X’s public key. Then we
have EX(m1) · EX(m2) = EX(m1 +m2). There are many cryp-
tosystems with such properties, e.g., Paillier cryptosystem [17].
Cryptographic Hash Function. In our system, we also use cryp-
tographic hash functions, which are publicly known and satisfy
the minimum security requirements – preimage resistance, second
preimage resistance and collision resistance.
4. OUR ETP SYSTEM
We start with an informal description of our toll process, and pro-
ceed with notations and specifications of the protocols involved.
4.1 Overview
Our system is organised in four phases. The first phase is about
the service subscription and set-up. A user first signs a contract
with a toll server. Both users and the server employ public key
encryption to secure their mutual communications. When users
contact the authority to join a group, the authority assigns them to
groups according to a group division policy (see Sect. 6). Clients’
private keys for group signatures are also established during the
phase. After this, the server is informed of the groups containing
its users and the corresponding group public keys.
The second phase is about collecting location data. During driving,
OBUs compute their location and time which, together with the
group name, form what we call a location tuple. OBUs periodically
send location tuples and the corresponding group signatures on the
hash values of the location tuples (called location signatures) to the
server, who stores them in its location database.
The third phase is about calculating tolls. At the end of a toll ses-
sion, each user contacts the server by using a user interface through
browsers (not OBUs). For any location tuple of a group, the server
publishes a fee tuple consisting of the hashed location tuple, and
the corresponding cipher text of its fee using the chosen homomor-
phic cyrptosystem. A user selects his own fee tuples and computes
the cypher text of his toll payments by multiplying the correspond-
ing encrypted fees. The server collects and decrypts all users’ toll
payments.
The fourth phase is about resolving a dispute. This phase takes
place only when the sum of user payments in a group is not equal
to the sum of all location tuples’ fees. The authority is involved to
determine the misbehaving user(s). The server sends the fee tuples
and location signatures to the authority. When location signatures
are opened, for each user, the authority identifies the encrypted fees
belonging to his location tuples, whose multiplication is compared
to the committed encrypted toll from the user. Any inequality indi-
cates that the corresponding user has cheated on his toll payment.
4.2 Notations
Tab. 1 summarises our notations. With c, S, and A we indicate
a user, the server, and the authority, respectively. With f(ℓ, t) we
indicate the fee to be paid when passing location ℓ at time t, while
cost c is the amount of fees that c comitted to pay after the toll
session sid . Sigc(m) denotes the signature on message m signed
by c, and Gsc(m) denotes the group signature of c on message m.
For other cryptographic primitives, we use standard notations.
4.3 Protocol Specifications
Table 1: Notations.
f(ℓ, t) The fee of passing position ℓ at time t
cost c The comitted toll payment of user c
sid The identifier of the toll session
SigX(m) Signature of message m generated by a prin-
cipal X
Gsc(m) Group signature of message m generated by a
group member c
gpk(G) The group public key of group G
pk(X) The public key of a principal X
sk(X) The private key of a principal X
h(m) The hash value of message m
EX(m) The message m encrypted with homomorphic
encryption with X’s public key
Encpk(X)(m) The message m encrypted with X’s public
key pk(X)
Here we specify the four protocols that implement the phases of
our system, namely: Set-up, Driving, Toll Calculation, and Dispute
Solving. In the following discussion, we fix a group G.
Phase 1: Set-up. This protocol accomplishes two tasks. The first
task is to establish the public key infrastructure between the users,
the server and the authority. The second task is to set up the group
infrastructure. The details are given in Appendix B.
Phase 2: Driving. The driving protocol specifies how users period-
ically transmit location tuples and location signatures to the server.
Let 〈ℓ, t,G〉 be a location tuple. A message from user c, a member
of group G, is denoted by (〈ℓ, t,G〉,Gsc(h(ℓ, t)). After receiving
this message, the server verifies Gsc(h(ℓ, t)) using the group pub-
lic key gpk(G). If valid, the received message is stored.
Phase 3: Toll Calculation. This protocol aims to reach an agree-
ment on toll payments between the server and its users. Let L′ be
the set of fee tuples of group G. An element in L′ is of the form
(h(ℓ, t), ES(f(ℓ, t))). We use Rc to denote the locations user c
has travelled and which are stored on the USB stick. We depict the
protocol in Fig. 2.
pk(S), sk(c),Rc
c
pk(c), sk(S)
S
G, sid
L′, sid, SigS(L
′, sid)
Check the correctness of L′
Compute
tollc = ES(
∑
(ℓ,t)∈Rc
f(ℓ, t))
Encpk(S)(tollc, Sigc(tollc, SigS(L
′, sid)))
Compute
costc = Dec(tollc, sk(S))
Encpk(c)(SigS(costc, sid, c))
Figure 2: The Toll Calculation protocol.
In the server’s response to c’s request, the server’s signature on L′
is used to indicate that the fee tuples originate from the server. The
user verifies the validity of this signature. By looking up the hash
values of his locations, the user identifies his set of fee tuples. Then,
for each of his location tuples (ℓ, t), the user computes ES(f(ℓ, t))
and compares it with the one in the corresponding fee tuple. If they
are the same then the fee tuple is correct. If all his fee tuples are
correct, he computes
toll c =
∏
(ℓ,t)∈Rc
ES(f(ℓ, t))
As the encryption is homomorphic, we have
toll c = ES(
∑
(ℓ,t)∈Rc
f(ℓ, t))
The user then sends back to the server his signature on tollc and
SigS(L
′, sid). This signature indicates that user c’s toll payment
in toll session sid is encrypted as toll c and computed based on L′
issued by the server. After receiving the user’s response, the server
verifies c’s signature before sending back its signature of c’s toll
payment decrypted from toll c.
Note that the set of fee tuples L′ can be published in a repository
in practice and accessed by authorised users. In this way, users are
able to download and check their validity without the need to be
connected to the server. Therefore, the real-time communication
overhead is small.
Phase 4: Dispute Resolving. In this protocol, with the help of the
authority, the server finds the cheating users and the amount of tolls
unpaid. The server initiates the dispute only when, with respect to
a group, the sum of committed payments is not equal to the sum
of fees of all location tuples. Let L be the set of location tuples of
group G. This condition can be formally described as
∑
c∈G
costc 6=
∑
(ℓ,t)∈L
f(ℓ, t)
A dispute will involve the authority, who can link a location sig-
nature to its signer. At the beginning of the dispute resolution, the
server constructs two sets S and T . S consists of the hash values of
the location tuples, the corresponding encrypted fees, and the sig-
natures of the location tuples that the server has received in phase
2, that is:
S = {〈h(ℓ, t),ES(fee(ℓ, t)),GSc (h(ℓ, t))〉 | ∀(ℓ, t) ∈ L,∀c ∈ G}
T consists of the users’ toll payment, that is:
T = {〈c, tollc, Sigc(toll c, SigS(L
′, sid))〉 | ∀c ∈ G}
We depict the protocol in Fig. 3. Note that for the sake of simplicity,
we do not show the cryptographic details.
The critical part of the protocol is the function DisRes , which is
shown in detail in Alg. 1. We use function checksign(sign,m, pk)
to check if the sign is a signature of m using pk and group signa-
ture functions VERIFY and OPEN work as described in Sect. 3. The
check on set T (line 5–8) and verification of location signatures
(line 10–11) exclude the possibility of modifying users’ toll pay-
ments by the malicious server. Each user’s real toll payment (i.e.,
toll c) is computed in lines 13–14. The equivalence to the user’s
committed one (i.e., toll c) means the user pays the right amount,
otherwise, he is cheating.
pk(A), sk(S)
S
pk(S), sk(A), gpk(G)
A
Mutual authentication
Compute S and T
S, T , SigS(L
′, sid)
res = DisRes(S, T , SigS(L
′, sid))
SigA(res, sid), res
Figure 3: The Dispute Resolving protocol.
After acquiring res from the authority, the server can obtain cheat-
ing users’ real toll by decrypting tollc = ES(costc) and the amount
of tolls unpaid as well. Note that after resolving, the authority
learns nothing about users’ locations except for the number of lo-
cation records of each user in that particular group.
Algorithm 1 Function DisRes .
1: Input: S ,T , SigS(L′, sid)
2: Output: R
3: res := ∅;
4: toll c := 0;
5: for all (c, toll , sign) ∈ T do
6: if checksign(sign, (toll , SigS(L′, sid)), pk(c)) = false
then
7: return ‘check of T failed’ ;
8: end for
9: for all (hashLoc, feeLoc, gsign) ∈ S do
10: if VERIFY(gsign,hashLoc) = false then
11: return ‘Faked location signatures’ ;
12: else
13: c =OPEN(gsign) ;
14: toll c := (if tollc = 0 then feeLoc else tollc · feeLoc);
15: end for
16: for all tollc 6= tollc do
17: res := res ∪ {(c, tollc)} ;
18: end for
19: return res
5. SECURITY PROPERTIES & ANALYSIS
In this section we define precisely what we mean by correctness,
accountability and unlinkability, and briefly discuss why our sys-
tem satisfies each of them. The full proof of our main theorem is
given in Appendix A.
Correctness. Correctness means that the server can collect the
right amount of tolls and all users pay their tolls exactly. There
are two underlying assumptions according to practical toll scenar-
ios. One is that a user has no intention to pay more than his actual
tolls while the other is that the server wants no loss of users’ tolls.
Let cost c be the real amount of tolls that user c should pay and
payc be the amount of tolls that user c actually pays to the server
after phase 4 of our system. Let tollG =
∑
c∈G cost c and be the
real amount of tolls from all users and payG =
∑
c∈G payc the
amount of tolls that the server actually collects from the group G
after phase 4 of our system. The property of correctness can be
defined as follows:
DEFINITION 1 (CORRECTNESS). Suppose the server wants
no loss of users’ tolls and users have no intention to pay more than
their tolls, then for any c ∈ G it holds that (payc = cost c), and for
the server it holds that (payG = costG ).
In our system, whenever a user has paid less, the server initiates the
dispute resolving protocol with the authority who would give the
correct toll of that user. Meanwhile, because of the properties of
group signatures, e.g., UNFORGEABILITY and EXCULPABILITY,
the server is unable to charge more locations than the ones users
submitted.
Accountability. This property means that upon detection of mali-
cious behaviour, our system can identify which principal has mis-
behaved.
Let B be the set of all potential misbehaviours from the attackers in
our system. So relation A = B × U represents all possible attacks
and the corresponding attackers. In our system, U = C ∪ {S,A}.
Let attacker : A → U be the function mapping an attack to the
attacker, e.g., attacker ((β, c)) = c. Let E be the set of evidences
during the run of our system and P(E) the power set of E. The
definition of accountability is given as follows:
DEFINITION 2 (ACCOUNTABILITY). Let A′ ⊆ A be the at-
tacks that actually happen during the execution of our system in
a toll session. For any α ∈ A′, our system is able to provide a
set of evidences E′ ∈ P(E) and there exists a function find :
P(E)×A → U such that find(E′, α) = attacker(α).
At steps where attackers may misbehave, our system provides suffi-
cient evidence to find the originators. For instance, when the server
did not send a user’s toll payment to the authority on purpose, the
server’s signature on the user’s payment could be taken as the evi-
dence to prove the server’s misbehaviour.
Despite the fact that our system assures accountability, resolving
disputes is still a costly step. We can establish a proper punishment
policy to discourage misbehaviours. This in turn also improves
the efficiency and performance of our system. For instance, by
punishing the cheating users, the frequency of dispute resolving
can actually be very small in practice.
Unlinkability. Unlinkability holds when, from the information
learned from the execution of our system, the attacher cannot de-
cide whether a user has travelled on any location. Proving unlink-
ability is equivalent to prove that the adversary cannot distinguish
the cases when two users swap their location information.
In order to enforce this property, we should consider two aspects.
First, from all messages learned after the execution of our system,
the attackers cannot link any location to its originator. For mali-
cious servers and users, the properties of group signature schemes,
i.e., ANONYMITY and UNLINKABILITY guarantee this property.
With regards to the honest but curious authority, implying that it
does not collude with other attackers and only learns the hash val-
ues of locations, the property of the hash function enforces unlink-
ability. Second, the communication process of the system does not
give any information about linkability. This means, the attacker
cannot break unlinkability through analysing differences between
executions of the system. In order to check the satisfaction of un-
linkability w.r.t. this situation, we apply the approach of formal ver-
ification (see Appendix A).
We now give the main theorem showing that our ETP system sat-
isfies the defined properties. The full proof of the theorem is given
in Appendix A.
THEOREM 1. Our ETP system guarantees correctness, account-
ability and unlinkability.
In Appendix C we also verified the relevant secrecy and authenti-
cation properties.
6. DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a simple design for ETP systems
which preserves users’ anonymity within groups. In our system,
our main design goal is to balance users’ privacy with communica-
tion and computation overhead: a large group means better privacy
for the users, while this gives rise to more overhead when running
the system. With the help of group signature schemes and a ho-
momorphic cryptosystem, our system is proved to guarantee cor-
rectness, accountability and unlinkability. To be complete, we still
have the following issues to address.
Comparison with VPriv. As mentioned in Sect. 1, our system
resembles VPriv [18] that the server collects locations. However,
VPriv imposes a relatively high burden to users and the server.
Compared with VPriv, in our system, the communication overhead
between users and the server is reduced. Clients are divided into
groups which leads to a smaller set of fee tuples which is returned
from the server to users. The toll calculation protocol also reduces
the number and the size of messages during the interaction. Second,
we apply the principle of separation of duties in our system, namely
the authority takes the responsibility to find cheaters. Hence, the
server and users are released from a heavy computation overhead
by avoiding running zero-knowledge proof protocols as in VPriv.
Resolving disputes needs to open all location signatures, which is
time consuming for the authority. However, with punishment poli-
cies and the accountability property of our system, the authority
can have a very low frequency of resolving disputes.
Group management. A good group management policy can im-
prove the protection of users’ privacy in our system. In principle,
groups should be chosen to maximise the difficulty for the adver-
sary to construct users’ traces. One way to achieve this goal is to
group people according to ‘similarity’ criteria based on multi-level
hierarchical structure, as proposed in [10]. For instance, at the root
level, we have the group of all users in a city. Subgroups at the
next level contain those that usually travel in the same region. At
lower levels the subgroups can include users having a similar driv-
ing style. Other factors can be considered as well, e.g., driving
periods, car models, etc. The information needed to group people
is collected by the authority at the moment of registration. The
provision of such information is not compulsory but users are en-
couraged if they desire a better privacy protection.
Dynamic group management, which enable users to change their
group memberships, is also necessary. For instance, users move to
another city or they are not satisfied with their current group. To
find the optimal group size which can protect users’ anonymity is
part of our future work. Note that if a user has joined in multiple
groups, the similarity between his travel records of these groups
would decrease his anonymity.
Tamper resistant devices vs. spot checks. In order to ensure
OBUs are not manipulated by users, e.g., to transmit false loca-
tions, we have to consider possible solutions. One way is to utilise
devices that are tamper resistant. However, users can always turn
off the device. Therefore, as discussed in VPriv and PrETP, we
can use sporadic random spot checks that observe some physical
locations of users. A physical observation of a spot check includes
location, time and the car’s plate number. Let 〈ℓ, t, pn〉 be an obser-
vation of car pnwhose owner is user c ∈ G. Then there should be at
least one location record 〈ℓ′, t′〉 of group G such that | t, t′ |< ǫ/2
and | ℓ, ℓ′ |< γ· | t, t′ | where ǫ is the interval between two trans-
missions and γ is the maximum speed of vehicles. If there are
no such location tuples, then the server can determine that user c
has misbehaved. Otherwise, the server could send the tuples with
nearby locations to the authority to check if there is one belonging
to c. According to [18], a small number of spot checks with a high
penalty would suffice.
Future work. In future, we plan to develop a prototype of our
system and conduct an experimental evaluation to compare its ef-
ficiency with PrETP and VPriv. A recently proposed ETP system
Milo [16] provides techniques based on blind identity based en-
cryption to strengthen spot checks in PrETP [3] to protect against
large-scale driver collusion. It is interesting to see how to adopt
these techniques into our system.
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APPENDIX
Appendix A: Proof of Theorem 1
LEMMA 1. Let L′ be the set of fee tuples. If the server wants to
collect no less tolls and users have no intention to pay more than
their tolls, then our system guarantees:
1. for any two sets of fee tuples L′1 and L′2 sent to users c1 and
c2 from G in phase 3, L′1 = L′2;
2. for each (h(ℓ, t), ES(fee)) ∈ L′, fee = f(ℓ, t);
3. L′ consists of all location tuples sent by users.
PROOF. We prove the three sub-lemmas one by one.
1. Suppose L′1 6= L′2. The server initiates the dispute resolv-
ing protocol when some users paid less. The authority per-
form the checks on signatures signc1 and signc2 (line 6 – 7
in Alg. 1). The server wants to finish resolution in order not to
lose tolls. This means both of the two checks succeed, which
implies SigS(L′, sid) = SigS(L′1, sid) = SigS(L′2, sid).
So we can get that L′ = L′1 = L′2. Contradiction.
2. Suppose fee tuple (h(ℓ, t), ES(fee)) with fee 6= f(ℓ, t), which
belongs to user c. In toll calculation, users check the correct-
ness of L′ before computing their payments. If the server
want no loss of the tolls, it has to ensure L′ is correctly com-
puted. Otherwise, the related users would refuse to pay and
take the server’s signature onL′ as the evidence of the server’s
misbehaviour. This guarantees that for 〈ℓ, t〉 of c, there exists
exactly one fee tuple (h(ℓ, t),ES(f(ℓ, t))), which contradicts
the assumption.
3. Suppose in L′, the server removes a fee tuple ϕ belonging
to user c. From the above two lemmas, user c receives the
same set of correct fee tuples without ϕ. Then c would give a
smaller toll payment. According to our system, user c would
not be taken as a cheater and the server then has to take the
loss. This contradicts our assumption that the server wants no
less tolls, therefore, the server would send the complete set of
fee tuples to users.
Proof of Theorem 1:
We prove the three properties one after another.
Correctness. We prove correctness from two aspects w.r.t. users
and the server, respectively.
1. We start proving, by contradiction, that our system enforces
that each user pays his real toll, that is ∀c∈G payc = cost c.
Suppose that a user c that has skipped some fees while ho-
momorphically summing up his fees, which ends in costc <
cost c. As users, initially, pay exactly the cost they have summed
and claimed to the server (which, we recall reveals them in
clear the due), it follows that costc = payc < costc. It fol-
lows (Lemma 1) that ∑c∈G cost c 6=
∑
(ℓ,t)∈L f(ℓ, t): the
server has ground to start the dispute resolving protocol. The
authority computes toll c (i.e.,ES(costc)) compares it with
toll c (i.e.,ES(cost c)), discovers that they are not equal and
returns it to the server with an accusation for c. The server
knows now the unpaid tolls cost c − cost c and he can claim
the missing due back. So, eventually, the amount paid by the
user must be payc = costc + (costc − cost c) = costc.
2. We prove that payG =
∑
c∈G costc. Straightforwardly fol-
lows from 1. and from payG =
∑
c∈G payc.
Accountability. In our system, the set B consists of the following
misbehaviours:
• β1: dishonest users send smaller toll payment to the server;
• β2: malicious users refuse to pay tolls;
• β3: the server attaches wrong fees to location tuples;
• β4: the server sends false location tuples to the authority;
• β5: the server sends less toll payments to the authority;
We prove accountability is secured against misbehaviours in B.
1. Assume α = (β1, c) happens, i.e., costc < costc. From
the proof of Lemma 1, we know c would be found out by the
authority. From the signed res from the authority, the server
learns tollc = ES(costc). Together with user c’s signature
on tollc and tollc 6= tollc, c cannot deny his misbehaviour.
2. Assume (β2, c) happens. We have the following two evi-
dences – (i) the server does not have user c’s signature on
sk(S), pin
S
pk(A), pk(S), sk(c), pin, sn
c
pk(S), sk(A), sn
A
pk(c), Encpk(S)(c, Sigc(pin))
Encpk(c)(SigS(pk(c), c))
nonce n
Encpk(A)(SigS(pk(c), c), pk(c), c, sn, S, n)
Encpk(c)(gpk(G),G, n)
Secure group Join communication
Figure 4: The Set-up protocol.
tollc; (ii) user c cannot provide the server’s signature on cost c
with ES(cost c) = tollc.
3. Assume (β3, S) happens. In this attack, we have at least one
fee tuple with a wrong fee. Let it be (h(ℓ, t), ES(fee)) where
fee 6= f(ℓ, t), and the location 〈ℓ, t〉 belongs to user c. When
c receives L′, he identifies the corresponding fee to 〈ℓ, t〉 is
ES(fee) which is not equal to ES(f(ℓ, t)). Then he termi-
nates the system. As the charging policy is public, with the
server’s signature on L′, the user can prove the server origi-
nates the attack.
4. Assume (β4, S) happens. With the properties UNFORGE-
ABILITY, EXCULPABILITY and COALITION-RESISTANCE of
group signature schemes, the server cannot forge any location
with a correct group signature from any honest user. There-
fore, a failure of function VERIFY (line 11 in Alg. 1) suffices
to determine the server’s misbehaviour.
5. Assume (β5, S) happens. Suppose the server omit user c’s
payments, i.e., toll c, which has been committed to the server
during toll calculation. In this case, the authority would return
res with toll c = ES(costc). However, c has the server’s sig-
nature on cost c and (if indeed the user has behaved correctly)
he can prove that cost c = costc. This message is sufficient
to prove the server’s misbehaviour.
Unlinkability. For attacks on analysis of messages used during the
execution of the system, the security of unlinkability is straightfor-
ward. In our system, location tuples are hashed and signed through
group signature schemes, which can be opened only by the author-
ity. However, due to preimage resistance of hash primitives, the
authority cannot learn users’ locations through location signatures.
Meanwhile, the properties of ANONYMITY and UNFORGEABILITY
ensure unlinkability against other attackers, i.e., the server and ma-
licious users.
The second type of attacks on unlinkability is through observing
the difference between system executions where users’ locations
are varied. We start from defining unlinkability w.r.t. this type of
attacks and proceed proving our system’s security using automatic
formal verification. We use processes to denote participants’ be-
haviours in protocols. Let C〈ϕ〉 be the process representing user
c originating location record ϕ and let A be the process of the au-
thority. We use C〈ϕ〉 | A to represent the parallel composition
of these two processes, which admits all possible communications
and interleavings. The intuition behind unlinkability is that if any
two users swap a pair of locations, the adversary cannot observe
the difference. Observational equivalence, which defines indistin-
guishability between two processes [1], gives us an effective way to
formalize unlinkability in our system. Similar to the case of elec-
tronic voting [7], we need at least two traveling users. Otherwise,
an intruder can easily link all location tuples to one user.
DEFINITION 3 (UNLINKABILITY). Assume that G is a group
with at least two users c and c′ and assume any two location records
ϕ and ϕ′. Unlinkability between a location tuple and its generator
holds if
A | C〈ϕ〉 | C′〈ϕ′〉 ≈ A | C〈ϕ′〉 | C′〈ϕ〉
ProVerif [4] is an efficient and popular tool for verifying security
properties in cryptographic protocols. It takes a protocol mod-
elled as a process in the applied π calculus [1] as input and checks
whether the protocol satisfies a given property. Observational equiv-
alence can be modelled and verified by ProVerif. Thus, the def-
inition of unlinkability leads us to an automatic verification. We
have modelled our system and the unlinkability property, and got
a positive result from ProVerif. This means our system preserves
unlinkability. (ProVerif codes are available on request.)
Appendix B: The Set-up Phase
We make use of two secrets to achieve the security goal of this
phase – the pin codes and the serial numbers. The former is gener-
ated by the server for users to prove their legal access to toll service,
while a serial number is issued with each OBU as a secret between
the authority and a user. We take user c as an example. Let pin
be his pin code and sn the serial number of his OBU. The Setup
protocol is depicted in Fig. 4. Upon receiving the user’s public key,
the server checks c’s signature on pin. If valid, the server replies
with its signature on the key, which the user sends to the authority
subsequently when joining a group. A replay attack on c’s message
to the authority is not feasible, as the same group would be returned
if the same request message arrives again. Fig. 4 does not include
the last step where the server learns from the authority its users’
groups and the group public keys, since such information can be
made public.
Appendix C: Secrecy and Authentication
We use ProVerif [4] to formally prove that our system as a whole
does not suffer from attacks on security and authentication. The
results are listed in Tab. 2. (ProVerif codes are available on request.)
We use setupCS to denote the protocol between the server (S) and
a user (c) in the setup phase and setupCA is between a user and
the authority (A). We say a term is secret if the attacker can-
not get it by eavesdropping and sending messages, and perform-
ing computations [4]. For authentication, we consider two notions,
namely, agreement and the slightly stronger notion injective agree-
ment [14]. Agreement roughly guarantees to an agent A that his
Table 2: Verification of authentication and secrecy.
Protocols Authentication Secrecyinjective non-injective
setupCS – c & S pin
setupCA A c sn
Toll Calculation – c & S tollc
Dispute resolving S & A – T , res
communication partner B has run the protocol as expected and that
A and B agreed on all exchanged data values. Injectivity further
requires that each run of A corresponds to a unique run of B.
